New York City Taxis in an Uber World by Mammen, Kristin & Shim, Hyoung Suk
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research College of Staten Island 
2018 
New York City Taxis in an Uber World 
Kristin Mammen 
CUNY College of Staten Island 
Hyoung Suk Shim 
CUNY College of Staten Island 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/si_pubs/205 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
   
mammen_shim_title_page_with_author_info.docx                         revised: 2018-03-31  15:57 1 
New York City Taxis in an Uber World 
Kristin Mammen∗ Hyoung Suk Shim† 
March 31, 2018  
 
 
∗Primary Contact:  
Kristin Mammen 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Economics 
School of Business 3N-230 
College of Staten Island 
City University of New York 
2800 Victory Boulevard 
Staten Island, New York 10314 
Phone: 917-280-3486 
Fax:  718-982-2965 
Email: Kristin.Mammen@csi.cuny.edu. 
 
 
† Hyoung Suk Shim 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
School of Business 3N-224A 
College of Staten Island 
City University of New York 
2800 Victory Boulevard 
Staten Island, New York 10314 
Phone: 917-280-3309 
Fax:  718-982-2965 
Email: Hyoungsuk.Shim@csi.cuny.edu. 
 
 
 
 
This research was supported, in part, under National Science Foundation Grants CNS-0958379 
and CNS- 0855217 and the City University of New York High Performance Computing Center 
at the College of Staten Island. 
 
Submission date: March 31, 2018 
 
   
mammen_shim_title_and abstract.docx                         revised: 2018-03-31  15:56 1 
New York City Taxis in an Uber World 
 
 
We empirically examine the effect of Uber’s presence on the demand 
for medallion taxi trips in New York City. We estimate the percent 
change in number of Yellow and Green cab trips given a one percent 
change in number of Uber rides – the elasticity - using rainfall as an 
instrumental variable. City-wide, Uber rides supplement, rather than 
replace, Yellow and Green cab rides. For Yellow cabs, this result is 
powered by the area of Manhattan below 110th street, however during 
the morning rush only, Uber rides replace yellow cab rides there.  These 
suggests Uber competition will have quite different effects in markets 
depending upon the thickness and vigor of the existing taxi market and 
site-specific commuting patterns.   
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New York City Taxis in an Uber World 
1 Introduction 
Uber, the leading smartphone app based ride-hailing company, has been touted for the 
efficiency of its service.  The benefits to both passengers and drivers have recently been 
examined by Cohen et al. (2016), Cramer and Krueger (2016), Hall and Krueger (2016),and 
Chen et al. (2017). In the meantime, Uber has experienced temporary bans from major cities 
such as London, Delhi, India, and Austin, Texas. Critics have assailed Uber for opaque 
p assenger safety requirements, increased traffic congestion, labor practices regarding its 
“driver-partners,” and its surge pricing policies. Another critical issue, that has not been well-
studied, is Uber’s impact on existing taxi cab services.  Evaluating whether Uber competition 
is a threat to the traditional taxi industry will inform the strategies of Uber and cities with 
disputes. 
New York City (NYC) has a large and well established taxi market, appropriate as an 
experimental field to conduct research on Uber’s impact. The NYC Taxi & Limousine 
Commission (TLC) has regulated the medallion cab service (Yellow cabs) for almost fifty 
years. Recently, TLC launched a new medallion cab service, called street hail livery (SHL, or 
Green cabs).1 In 2015, the medallion taxi fleet comprised 7,676 Green cabs and 13,587 Yellow 
cabs (TLC 2016 page 1).2  
Specifically, we estimate the percent change in Yellow and Green cab trips given a one 
percent change in Uber rides – the elasticity- using NYC medallion taxi trip records and Uber 
pick-up records from April to September 2014, and January to June 2015. We use rainfall as 
an instrumental variable to control for endogenous factors affecting medallion taxi demand in 
a taxi trip demand model. 
The Uber–rides elasticity of demand for Yellow cab rides for the entire New York City 
area is about 4.7%, 9.1% for Green cab rides.  These GMM estimates have strong statistical 
significance and sufficiently small overidentification test statistics. 
                                                     
1 Green cabs are restricted from picking up passengers in the core Manhattan zone (below West 110th Street 
and East 96th Street), and at the two NYC airports (TLC 2013). Other than this restriction, TLC regulations are 
the same for both Yellow and Green cabs. 
2 See TLC (2016) for more NYC taxi statistics. 
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 We find that the distribution of rides across the boroughs differs for Yellow Cabs, Green 
Cabs, and Uber cars.  Figure 3(a) shows the proportion of Yellow cab rides relative to the sum 
of all three types of rides in each zip code, 3(b) the proportion for Green cab rides, and 3(c) 
for Uber rides.  Yellow cabs predominate in the core Manhattan zone, below West 110th 
Street and East 96th Street, and at the airports, Green cabs in the Bronx and in patches of 
Brooklyn and Queens.  Uber cars predominate in some of the outer areas of the Bronx and 
Queens, and parts of Staten Island.  We therefore disaggregate the data into boroughs and 
divide Manhattan into the areas above and below 110th Street. The Uber-ride elasticity 
estimate of demand for Yellow cab rides is statistically significant only in Manhattan below 
110th Street, about 4.1%. By looking at the median daily trip statistics in Table 3, in addition, 
91% of City-wide Yellow cab trips and 70% of City-wide Uber trips occurred in Manhattan 
below 110th Street. 
We also disaggregate the data by time of day and weekday/weekend. In Manhattan below 
110th Street, we estimate a -2.1% Uber-ride elasticity during the morning rush hour between 
6 am and 9 am on weekdays, and 3.9% during the weekend.  The negative coefficient for the 
Uber elasticity in Manhattan below 110th Street during the morning rush hour implies that 
Uber rides replace, rather than supplement, medallion taxi trips during the rush in the central 
business district of Manhattan In the boroughs outside Manhattan, we estimate 4.6% Uber 
elasticity during the morning rush hour, and 9.7% during the weekend, suggesting that Uber 
rides supplement,  rather than replace, medallion taxi trips during the morning rush outside 
Manhattan, and on the weekends. 
We observe an opposite pattern in the Uber elasticity of Green cab trip demand. In the 
outer boroughs, we find statistically significant Uber-ride elasticities of about 5.3% during the 
morning rush hour, and -6.5% during the weekend. This result can be interpreted as, for Green 
cab passengers, Uber rides supplement Green cab rides during the morning rush hour, but 
replace them during the weekend. However, the overidentification test statistics for Uber-ride 
elasticity estimates by different times of day and weekday/weekend are too large to accept 
them as supporting evidence.  
The studies most closely related to our topic, on the supply side of the taxi market, are 
Farber (2015) and Brodeur and Nield (2016). They examine the NYC cabdrivers’ labor supply, 
the well-known behavioral economics topic established by Camerer et al. (1997), Farber 
(2008), and Crawford and Meng (2011). Farber (2015) revisits the issue and shows that the 
wage elasticity of NYC cabdrivers’ labor supply is positive, consistent with the prediction of the 
neoclassical labor supply model. He finds  that when it rains, the number of taxi trips in NYC 
increases while the total fare income does not change; and shows that cabdrivers’ 
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heterogeneous preferences may yield negative wage elasticities. Brodeur and Nield (2016) use 
a similar research design, and find that the number of daily Uber rides increases on rainy days, 
suggesting that Uber drivers respond positively to increases in demand. The validity of the 
instrumental variables in the current investigation relies on the positive effect of precipitation 
on the number of Uber and medallion taxi rides. 
The closely related studies on the demand side of the taxi market are Cohen et al. (2016) 
and Buchholz (2016). Cohen et al. (2016) utilize a large-scale dataset of individual Uber trip 
records four U.S. cities, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. They use Uber’s 
surge pricing algorithms to identify the price elasticity of demand for Uber rides at each price 
point, and then calculate the total associated consumer surplus .In the current investigation, 
we focus on estimating the elasticity of demand for medallion taxis relative to changes in the 
quantity of Uber rides. Buchholz (2016) investigates the consumer surplus of the taxi market 
in NYC with respect to search friction and regulated taxi fares with a large dataset of taxi ride 
characteristics. He shows that if search costs are removed (as they might be if medallion taxis 
adopted ride-rider matching technologies like Uber’s), consumer surplus is doubled by 
substantially increasing number of daily trips (matching taxi supply to taxi demand). 
Random utility maximization has been a predominant model in the travel demand 
literature, since the seminal work by Domencich and McFadden (1975) and McFadden 
(1974).  We use an aggregate version of the travel demand model, proposed by Peters et al. 
(2011), to develop a demand model for the count of taxi rides with a single trip mode (taxi), 
which allows us to estimate the elasticity of demand for taxi trips relative to the quantity of 
Uber rides.  A number of papers have studied the demand for taxi  trips using different model 
specifications:  Douglas (1972), De Vany (1975), Beesley and Glaister (1983), Cairns and 
Liston-Heyes (1996), Arnott (1996), and Flores-Guri (2003).  These studies analyze the taxi 
trip market with the fare as the unit price of the trip, and discuss whether the regulated fare 
yields the second best in terms of efficiency, given the monopoly pricing in the market which 
arises due to the use of medallion licensing as an entry control. 
Jackson and Schneider (2011) and Schneider (2010) examine New York City taxi drivers’ 
moral hazard which motivates the drivers to engage in risky driving and criminal activities. 
The unit of observation in these studies, however, is the individual driver’s legal record, not 
individual taxi trips. 
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2 The Empirical Framework 
Our primary goal is to estimate the elasticity of NYC medallion cab demand with respect to 
quantity of Uber rides. In order to consider spatiotemporal variation, we estimate a panel data 
model for taxi trip demand 
 
yit = δ ꞏ uit + xitβ + γi + θt + cit, (2.1) 
where yit is the number of NYC medallion taxi trips, uit is the number of Uber trips, xit is a 
vector of medallion taxi trip attributes, γi and θt are location and time specific effects 
respectively; and cit is the location-time specific error term. The unit of location, NYC zip 
code, is represented by i, while t represents the time period, hour of day-month-year. To 
estimate the coefficient of interest, δ, we must control for the endogeneity of the demand for 
Uber rides and of the medallion taxi trip attributes which stem from the cab drivers’ labor 
supply behavior. We also must account for the non-uniform and nonstationary spatiotemporal 
variation in the data series of the demand for taxi trips. For yit and uit, we take the log of 
number of taxi trips and the log of number of Uber trips respectively; therefore the estimate 
of δ is interpreted as the elasticity of demand for taxi trip rides with respect to the number of 
Uber rides. 
 
2.1 Data 
We use NYC medallion taxi trip records and Uber pick-up records from April to September 
2014, and January to June 2015. Medallion cabs’ individual trip records are available to the 
public from the TLC’s website. The records have detailed information about individual taxi 
trips such as pick-up and drop-off date/time, pick-up and drop-off location in GPS coordinates 
(latitude and longitude), trip distance, itemized fares, number of passengers, etc. Uber does 
not make its trip records public, so we use data provided by FiveThirtyEight that have pick-up 
time and location only. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
Descriptive statistics for the daily taxi trip records are reported in Table 1. Over the sample 
period, Uber’s market share is around 10% of the NYC yellow taxi trip market. In the first 
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row we see the median number of daily pick-ups is about 440,000 for Yellow cabs, 47,000 for 
Green cabs, and 40,000 for Uber cars (columns 1, 2, and 3).  Columns 3 and 4 show the 
median total taxi fare of daily trips is about 7 million dollars for Yellow cabs, and 700,000 
dollars for Green cabs.  The median total distance of daily trips is about 1.4 million miles for 
Yellow cabs, and 136,000 miles for Green cabs (columns 6 and 7). The total number of 
pick-ups over the sample period, in the bottom row, columns 1, 2, and 3, is about 159 million 
for Yellow cabs, 17 million for Green cabs, and 19 million for Uber cars. 
We aggregate the individual trip records of Yellow cabs, Green cabs, and Uber cars 
separately by pick-up zip code (location identifier i) and hour-day-month-year (time period 
identifier t) We then match and merge the records for the three taxi trip services, with unit of 
observation pick-up zip code and hour-month-year. For Yellow Cabs, Green cabs, and Uber 
cars from 2014, we assign the 248 unique NYC zip code areas to each individual trip record 
according to the trip’s pick-up geographic coordinates, longitude and latitude. The zip code 
assignment for Uber pick-up is the same for the 2014 records. Instead of the single point pick-
up coordinates, the 2015 Uber records have “taxi zone identifiers.” We therefore assign zip 
codes to the 2015 Uber trip records using the zip code area that overlaps most with the taxi 
zone. The sample period comprises 364 days and 12 months. The total number of time points, 
hour-day-month-year, is 8,736.  With 248 zip code areas assigned to each time point, the total 
number of observations is 2,166,528.  
The rain data that we use for an instrumental variable, produced by the National Centers 
for Environmental Prediction (NCEP), have 1121 × 881 grids covering the entire U.S. 
territories on the North American continent. The stage IV weather radar measures three 
meteorological quantities (reflectivity, radial velocity, and spectrum-width base) in  each  
grid.  Hourly precipitation accumulation within each four square kilometer boundary grid is 
then calculated based on the three quantities.  We use the hourly precipitation data for the 189 
grids covering New York City in our empirical analysis.3  
 
                                                     
3 See Hamidi et al. (2017) for more details about the stage IV radar data. Many thanks to Ali Hamidi and 
Naresh Devineni of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/Cooperative Remote Sensing Science 
and Technology Center at the City College of the City University of New York for sharing the data. 
 
6 
 
2.2 Identification 
The regression model (2.1) is a demand model, and therefore controlling for endogeneity due 
to unobservable supply factors is crucial to identify the parameters in the model. Along with 
hourly precipitation, we use indicator variables for pick-up zip codes as instrumental variables 
for the number of Uber trips and the endogenous medallion taxi trip attributes such as trip 
distance, trip time length, and number of passengers. 
We argue that rainfall and the pick-up location of taxi trips are valid instruments because 
i) taxi trip demand is highly correlated with rainfall; but ii) cab drivers’ labor supply is 
uncorrelated with rain because of the compliance rule for any passengers’ trip request. Farber 
(2015) and Brodeur and Nield (2016) are the first studies of the effect of rain on NYC taxi 
cab and Uber drivers’ labor supply respectively. Farber (2015) finds that taxi demand 
substantially increases when it rains, but drivers’ income does not change. This is due to a 
decrease in the supply of taxi trips because i) traffic congestion gets worse when it rains; and 
ii) drivers prefer not to drive in the rain so they tend to stop their shifts early. Brodeur and 
Nield (2016) document evidence that Uber drivers positively respond to increasing demand 
when it rains.  We therefore infer that the magnitude of the Uber drivers’ response is 
substantially greater than the medallion cab drivers’. 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
We argue further that taxi trip supply is uncorrelated with rainfall due to the compliance 
rule. The TLC mandates drivers to accept any trip requests, unless the vehicle is occupied and 
the passengers do not want to pick-up additional passengers, or the prospective passenger is 
in possession of an article that would damage the vehicle or leave a stain or foul smell (TLC 
2010 Section 2-50(e)(3)). According to the TLC rulebook (Section 2-50(a), “a driver shall not 
seek to ascertain the destination of a passenger before such passenger is seated in the taxicab.”4  
We find some support for this argument in our data. Precipitation in a given hour-location 
is almost uncorrelated with the average speed of taxi trips occurring in that hour-location. As 
shown in Figure 1(a) in log scale, the scatterplot of average taxi trip speed is almost flat with 
respect to precipitation. We further find that precipitation is positively correlated with the 
number of taxi trips (0.0081), and negatively correlated with trip distance (-0.0018), trip time 
length (-0.0040), and total fare (-0.0013) (all in log scale). These correlation coefficients are 
                                                     
4 See TLC (2010) for more details about cab rules and regulations. 
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suggestive that taxi trips increase in frequency and decrease in length when it rains; however 
the magnitudes of the coefficients are too small to be statistically significant, as shown in the 
first column of the scatterplot matrix in Figure 1(b). 
 
2.3 Spatiotemporal Distribution 
It is well-known that econometric estimation with nonstationary data may cause either 
inconsistent estimation of the target parameter due to serial correlation in the error term,   or 
inefficient standard error estimation due to heteroskedasticity. To control for nonstationarity 
issues, we apply the first-differencing transformation by day-month- year for all variables in 
(2.1). Prima facie, the data series of the number of NYC medallion taxi trips and Uber trips 
are nonstationary over time, due to factors such as whether a driver’s shift is a day shift or a 
night shifts and whether it is rush hour or not. Income targeting on the part of cab drivers, 
addressed by a number of behavioral economics papers, could also produce nonstationarity in 
taxi trips. Farber (2015), in particular, demonstrates the time variation in NYC medallion cab 
trips. He shows that day shift cab drivers have more rigid start times, whereas end times are 
more rigid for night shift drivers.5  
[Figure 2 about here.] 
 
To illustrate the daily variation in our dataset that may cause nonstationarity, 
Figure 2(a) shows time series plots for the number of medallion cab trips and Uber trips by 
day. Uber trips have a steady growth trend while the plot for medallion cabs is stable. 
These different long-run trends may prevent the estimation of the causal relationship 
between the number of Uber trips and the number of medallion cab trips. The scatterplot 
of first differenced variables in Figure 2(d) shows a clear positive linear relationship, which 
does not appear in Figure 2(c). 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
 
                                                     
5 Farber (2015) finds that there are two peaks in the hourly distribution of shift start times, additional evidence 
that the time variation of taxi trips is nonstationary. 
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The spatial distribution of the taxi trip data shows that Yellow cabs, Green cabs, and 
Uber cars serve different areas of New York City. Uber and Green cab pick-ups occur in 
wider areas than Yellow cab pick-ups. Figure 3 presents NYC taxi zone maps showing the 
median proportion of daily pick-ups by zip code.  The Yellow cab pick-ups mostly occur 
in the core Manhattan zone and the two airports, whereas Green Cabs and Uber cars have 
broader pick-up distributions.6 
3 Empirical Results 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
Table 2 reports estimation results of the model (2.1), with Yellow cab trips in columns 1, 
2, and 3, and Green cab trips in 4, 5, and 6.  All variables, excluding indicators, are log-
differenced from the same zip code-hour-day-month-year hour of 24 hours previous. Since all 
the variables are in log scale, each coefficient represents the elasticity of the designated cab 
rides (Yellow or Green) with respect to the corresponding variable. 
We find a City-wide Uber-ride elasticity of 4.7% for Yellow cab trips with respect to Uber 
rides, and 9.1% for Uber-ride elasticity for Green cab trips in the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimations in columns 3 and 6. These positive and statistically significant 
coefficients imply that Uber rides supplement both Yellow and Green cab trips. In particular, 
a 1% increase in Uber trips causes a 4.7% increase in Yellow cab trips and a 9.1% increase in 
Green cab trips. Although the magnitudes differ, the sign and statistical significance of the 
GMM estimates are the same as those from the OLS specification (columns 1 and 4) and the 
two-stage least squares (TSLS) specification (columns 2 and 5).   
The Uber-ride elasticity of Green cab trips found in Table 2 is twice the size of Yellow 
cab trips. This difference results from the large disparity in in market share held by Yellow 
and Green cabs in the five New York City boroughs. As shown in Table 3, about 91% of daily 
Yellow cab trips and 70% of daily Uber trips occurred in Manhattan below 110th Street, 
whereas only 7% of Green cab trips occurred in that area.7 The 4.7% Uber-ride elasticity of 
Yellow cab trips is therefore powered by rides in Manhattan below 110th Street, and the 9.1% 
                                                     
6 Recall Green cabs are restricted from picking up passengers in the core Manhattan zone (below West 110th 
Street and East 96thStreet), and at the two NYC airports TLC (2013). This is the reason that Figure 3(b) shows 
Green cabs with almost no pick-ups in those areas. 
7 For each type of service, find the percent of rides in Manhattan below 110th Street by dividing the total number of rides below 
110th Street (in the top row in columns 3, 6, and 9)) by the sum of the numbers in the “Total” column. 
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Uber elasticity of Green cab trips is powered by rides in Brooklyn and Queens, where 63% 
of Green cab trips occurred. 
The GMM estimates are our preferred results, because this specification controls for the 
endogeneity of cab drivers’ labor supply and the nonstationarity of taxi rides, providing 
statistically consistent Uber elasticity estimates.  In addition, the overidentification (overid) 
test statistics show that the GMM results do not reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental 
variables are exogenous.  Although the TSLS estimates are qualitatively similar to the GMM 
estimates, the TSLS overid test statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.  We 
do not believe these statistics invalidate the instrumental variables. Rather, we suspect that the 
heteroskedasticity resulting from the nonstationary data causes the rejection of the 
overidentifying restriction in TSLS. 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
 
Examining our data, we find suggestive evidence of heteroskedasticity in the hourly data 
series for number of taxi trips, which is nonstationary, and is successfully controlled for in 
Table 2 GMM estimation. The data series for the daily number of taxi trips appears 
(relatively) stationary in log-differenced form, but the hourly data series does not. Figure 4 
shows daily and hourly variations in the number of pick-ups before and after 
log-differencing. Comparing panels 4(a) and 4(b), the log-differencing appears to make the 
daily data series stationary, that is, the series randomly fluctuates around zero. The log-
differencing for the hourly data series, however, seems to amplify the morning and evening 
rush hours, causing nonstationarity. In 4(c), the log-scale series declines substantially in the 
middle of the night. In 4(d) the log-differenced series remains nonstationary, with two peaks, 
one in the morning rush hour between 6 am and 9 am, and the other at the evening rush hour 
between 5 pm and 7 pm. 
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
3.1 The Effect of Uber Trips on Yellow Cab Trips 
[Table 4 about here.] 
Table 4, column 1, reproduces the GMM estimates of the Uber-ride elasticity of the demand 
for Yellow cab trips for all of New York City from Table 2, column 3, and then reports 
estimates by borough and Manhattan below and above 110th Street. The overid test statistics 
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do not reject the overidentifying restriction, and therefore the instrumental variables are valid 
for the estimates in Table 4. 
We see in column 3 that the 4.7% City-wide Uber-ride elasticity for Yellow cab trips comes 
mostly from Manhattan below 110th Street, where the Uber-ride elasticity estimate is 4.1%.  
The elasticity estimate for all of Manhattan is about 3.3%, and in Manhattan above 110th 
Street, 23%, although neither is statistically significant. Uber trips appear to supplement 
Yellow cab trips in Manhattan below 110th Street. 
The Uber elasticity estimates outside Manhattan are positive but statistically insignificant. 
The elasticity estimates in Brooklyn and Queens have, however, Z-statistics that exceed one. 
It is thus too early to conclude that Uber trips have no impact on Yellow cab trip outside of 
Manhattan below 110th Street. We are unable to estimate the elasticity in Staten Island due to 
the insufficient number of observations. 
In Table 5 we report Uber elasticity estimates for weekday rush hours and on the weekend, 
in Manhattan below and above 110th Street, and for the other boroughs grouped together. 
Interestingly, we have a negative Uber elasticity estimate of -2.1% in Manhattan below 110th 
Street during the morning rush hour, statistically significant at the 5% level. Below 110th 
Street, the elasticity estimate for the weekend is about 4%, close to the City-wide elasticity of 
Yellow cab trips. The negative morning rush hour elasticity suggests that Uber trips replace 
Yellow cab trips at that hour.  Note, however that that the overid test statistics for both of 
these specifications strongly reject the overidentifying restriction. Thus, these two Yellow cab 
trip samples need to be re-examined with more observations. The elasticity estimate for the 
evening rush is less than 1% but not statistically significant. 
[Table 5 about here.] 
 
3.2 The Effect of Uber on Green Cab Trips 
Table 6 reports GMM estimates of the Uber-ride elasticity for Green cab trips during 
the rush hours on weekdays, on the weekend in Manhattan above 110th Street, and in the other 
boroughs grouped together.  There are no statistically significant Uber-ride elasticity estimates 
for Green cab trips at any time in Manhattan above 110th Street. In the boroughs outside 
Manhattan, the Uber elasticity estimate is about 5% during the morning rush hour, and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. During the weekend, however, the elasticity estimate 
is about -6.5% and statistically significant at the 1% level, in contrast to the positive Uber 
elasticity for Yellow cab trips in Table 5, column 9. The negative elasticity suggests that Uber 
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rides replace Green cab trips in the outer boroughs on the weekend. But this elasticity estimate 
needs to be re-examined with more observations because the overid test statistic strongly 
rejects the overidentifying restriction.  
[Table 6 about here.] 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
We have empirically examined the effect of Uber’s presence on the demand for 
medallion taxi trips in New York City. Specifically, we estimate the percent change in 
Yellow and Green cab trips given a one percent change in Uber rides – the elasticity - using 
NYC medallion taxi trip records and Uber pick-up records from April to September 2014, 
and January to June 2015. We use rainfall as an instrumental variable in a taxi trip demand 
model to control for endogenous factors affecting medallion taxi demand. We find that 
whether Uber’s presence supplants medallion taxi rides or increases demand for them 
depends on location and traffic conditions influenced by time of day and weekday/ 
weekend status.  Our statistically significant results most often show a positive effect of 
Uber rides on taxi demand.  However, Uber pick-ups decrease the number of Yellow taxi 
rides in Manhattan below 110th Street during the morning rush hour.  They also decrease 
the number of Green cab rides on the weekend in the outer boroughs grouped together.  
We view these two results with caution because in both specifications the 
overidentifying restriction is strongly rejected. But they suggest that Uber competition 
will have quite different effects in markets depending upon factors such as the thickness 
and vigor of the existing taxi market and site-specific commuting patterns. Documenting 
the market characteristics which make the presence of Uber a positive or negative force 
on the demand for traditional taxis is an important area for future research.      
 
We find that, City-wide, Uber rides supplement, rather than replace, Yellow cab 
and Green cab rides. For Yellow cabs, the City-wide positive and significant Uber-ride 
elasticity of the demand for Yellow cab trips is powered by the positive and significant 
Uber-ride elasticity in Manhattan below 110th Street, where 91% (70%) of daily Yellow 
cab trips (Uber trips) are initiated. We also estimate the elasticities by borough and by 
time of day.  However, this elasticity differs by time of day.  We find a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for the Uber-ride elasticity of the demand for Yellow 
cab trips in Manhattan below 110th Street during the morning rush hour.  This coefficient 
implies that Uber rides replace, rather than supplement, medallion taxi trips during the 
rush in the central business district of Manhattan, in contrast to other times of day in this 
area.  
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Figure 1: Scatterplot: Rainfall and Taxi Trips (Log-scale) 
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(a) Yellow cab pick-up (b) Green cab pick-up 
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Figure 3: Spatial Distribution: Proportion of Pick-ups for each type of 
service by Zip code, respectively, relative to the sum of pick-ups by all 
three services in that zip code     
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Figure 4: (Aggregate) Time Variation: Medallion Taxi Pick-ups 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
#of pick-ups          Total Fare                 Total Trip Distance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
 Yellow cab Green cab Uber Yellow cab Green cab  Yellow cab Green cab 
Median 440,246 47,700 40,520 $6,946,085 $703,083  1,378,623 136,663 
Std. dev 53,393.084 14,838.045 29,783.888 $859,212.970 $229,988.996  8,073,866.198 45,088.851
Max 544,519 81,574 136,193 $10,000,912 $1,569,859  60,720,968 244,962 
Min 0 0 0 $0 $0  0 0 
Total Sum 159,481,189 17,166,393 18,804,806 $2,496,244,821 $254,233,258  1,516,589,012 50,496,604
  
Note: Std. dev, Max, and Min stand for standard deviation, maximum and minimum value 
respectively. Median, Standard deviation, Minimum, and Maximum are statistics for rides per day. 
Total sum is for the entire dataset. 
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Table 2: Model Estimates with Log-Differenced Variables 
 
# of Taxi Pickups by hour and zip code 
   Yellow Cab    Green Cab    
        (1)               (2)                (3)                 (4)               (5)               (6) 
OLS TSLS GMM  OLS TSLS GMM 
 
Uber 0.0242*** 0.0706*** 0.0466** 0.0154*** 0.1127*** 0.0912*** 
(Log-differenced)  [0.000]  (0.017)  (0.018)  [0.001]  (0.027)  (0.025) 
Trip distance -0.0895***  -0.2494***   -0.2407*** -0.0906*** 0.0543* 0.0212 
(Log-differenced) [0.004] (0.053) (0.063) [0.005] (0.029) (0.027) 
Trip time 0.1017*** 0.1044** 0.0674** 0.0461*** 0.0209 0.0170*** 
(Log-differenced)  [0.002]  (0.047)  (0.032)  [(0.001] (0.013)  (0.004) 
Passengers 0.4463*** 0.5316*** 0.6236*** 0.4603*** 0.4810*** 0.4932*** 
(Log-differenced)  [0.002]  (0.027)  (0.045)  [0.002]  (0.035)  (0.043) 
Meter fare 0.4514*** 0.5269*** 0.4800*** 0.4841*** 0.3177*** 0.3513*** 
(Log-differenced)  [0.006]  (0.052)  (0.096)  [0.007]  (0.053)  (0.063) 
Tip -0.0420*** -0.0469***  -0.0388*** -0.0401*** -0.0359*** -0.0363*** 
(Log-differenced)  [0.001] (0.004) (0.007)  [0.001] (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant -0.0238***  -0.0297*** -0.0177** -0.0243*** 0.0065 0.0010 
[0.002] (0.006) (0.008) [0.002] (0.007) (0.007) 
# of obs 391,181 391,181 391,181 208,385 208,385 208,385 
R2 0.9008 0.8867 0.8787 0.8944 0.8774 0.8837 
χ2 Test Statistic (df) 375.92 (150) 102.70 (150) 276.89 (126) 74.91 (126) 
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.9988) (0.0000) (0.9999) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in square brackets. The symbols, *, **, and *** indicate respectively that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The TSLS and GMM estimates treat “# of Uber pickups”, “trip distance”, “trip time”, and “# of passengers,” as endogenous covariates. The instrumental variables are precipitation and the indicator variables for trip origin ZIP Code. The row for χ2 test, 2nd from the bottom, reports the overidentification test statistics with degrees of freedom   in parentheses. The associated p-values are reported in the lowest row in parentheses. Note that all model estimates contains fixed effect indicator variables for i) months, ii) years, and iii) weekdays. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Number of Trips by Borough 
 
Yellow cab Green cab Uber 
   
    (1)         (2)           (3)                (4)          (5)            (6)             (7)       (8)            (9) 
Median Std. Dev Total Median Std. Dev  Total Median Std. Dev Total 
Below 110th st  386,145 44,875  139,228,280  3,578 1,025 1,237,478  28,928 18,213 12,489,445 
Above 110th st 5,234 1,279 1,987,334 10,135 2,710 3,609,152 891 1,132 515,003 
Brooklyn 8,356 3,810 3,513,685 16,440 6,567 6,074,914 6,544 5,327 2,811,660
Queens 15,320 2,148 5,563,737 13,023 4,021 4,703,185 2,408 2,858 1,399,821
Bronx 297 117 121,565 3,601 1,144 1,308,222 369 637 254,801 
Staten Island 5 4.62 2,064 7 4.94 2,616 15 20 7,992 
Airports 8,439 1,169 3,093,857 161 52.1 58,952 828 626 378,678 
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Table 4: GMM Estimates of Yellow Cab Demand (# of pick-ups) 
 
 Entire sample  Manhattan Brooklyn Queens Bronx 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All Below 110th Above 110th    
Uber 0.0466** 0.0330 0.0407** 0.2278 0.1082 0.1236 0.0344 
(Log-differenced) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.271) (0.097) (0.096) (0.077)
# of obs 391,181 259,791 228,679 31,112 75,543 46,014 1,785 
R2 0.8787 0.8889 0.9208 0.6974 0.8758 0.8173 0.7541 
χ2 Test (df) 102.70(150) 14.75(63) 9.90(51) 0.81(8) 19.74(32) 21.40(30) 8.49(11)
(p-value) (0.9988) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9992) (0.9556) (0.8751) (0.6690) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in square brackets. The symbols, *, **, and ***∗ indicate respectively that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 5: GMM Estimates for Yellow Cab Trips by Weekday Rush Hour and Weekend 
 
 
 
 
                        Morning Evening Weekend Morning Evening Weekend Morning Evening Weekend 
Uber -0.0207** 0.0041 0.0389*** 0.0254 0.1278 -0.0488 0.0458* 0.0443 0.0969*** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.141) (0.118) (0.086) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) 
# of obs 26,714 24,604 63,605 4,070 3,112 10,115 18,352 11,750 43,390 
R2 0.9309 0.8540 0.9139 0.7698 0.8252 0.7647 0.7194 0.8386 0.7587 
χ2 Test (df) 79.73(49) 41.67(51) 233.41(51) 1.81(8) 3.00(8) 8.79(8) 88.55(70) 74.09(60) 128.71(78) 
(p-value) (0.0036)   (0.8213) (0.0000) (0.9863) (0.9346) (0.3607) (0.0665)   (0.1043) (0.0003) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in square brackets. The symbols, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate respectively that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.  Morning (evening) rush hour is between 6 am (5 pm) and 9 am (7 pm) on weekdays.   
 
 Manhattan Below 110th st  Manhattan Above 110th st  Other Boroughs 
           (1)              (2)             (3)        (4)              (5)           (6)          (7)             (8)              (9) 
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          Table 6: GMM Estimates for Green Cabs by Weekday Rush Hour and Weekend 
 
Manhattan Above 110th st Other Boroughs 
  
     (1)            (2)         (3)             (4)             (5)            (6) 
Morning  Evening  Weekend   Morning   Evening Weekend 
Uber -0.0080 0.0107 -0.0704 0.0526* -0.0000 -0.0648*** 
 (0.106) (0.086) (0.051) (0.031) (0.018) (0.024) 
# of obs 4,346 3,472 10,719 20,802 17,655 52,202 
R2 0.8649 0.6257 0.8953 0.8244 0.7760 0.7799 
χ2 Test (df) 4.23(8) 0.31(8) 5.65(8) 97.81(75) 91.36(78) 208.95(89) 
(p-value) (0.8358) (1.0000) (0.6868) (0.0397)   (0.1430) (0.0000) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are reported in square brackets. The symbols, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate 
respectively that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. Morning (evening) rush hour is between 6 am (5 pm) and 9 am (7 pm) 
on weekdays.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
